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Abstract
The males of the specie of frogs Engystomops pustulosus produce simple and com-
plex calls to lure females, as a way of Intersexual selection. Complex calls lead males to
a greater reproductive success than simple calls do. However, the complex calls are also
more attractive to the main predator of these amphibians, the bat Trachops cirrhosus.
Therefore, as M. Ryan suggests in [10], the complexity of the calls let the frogs keep a
trade off between reproductive success and predation. In this paper, we first propose to
model the proportion of simple to complex calls as a symmetric game of two strategies.
We also propose a model with three strategies (simple callers, complex callers and quiet
males), where we assess the effect of a male that keeps quiet and intercepts females,
which would play a role of Intrasexual selection. We analyze the stable points of the
replicator equations of the models that we propose. Under the assumption that the
decision of the males takes into account this trade off between reproductive success and
predation, our model reproduces the observed behavior reported in the literature with
minimal assumption on the parameters. From the three strategies model, we verify
that the quiet strategy could only coexists with the simple and complex strategies as
long as the rate at which quiet males intercept females is high. We conclude that the
reproductive strategy of the male frog Engystomops pustulosus is rational.
1 Introduction
Tu´ngara frog (Engystomops pustulosus) is an example of a specie where males have devel-
oped displays in order to attract females more efficiently. In consequence, these amphibians
are an example of Sexual Selection, as Darwin referred. Tu´ngara males display a great va-
riety of calls. As females chooses the males base on the complexity of the call (as M. Ryan
demonstrates in [10]), we can refer to this kind of selection as Intersexual selection ([3]).
The simplest one is a low frequency sound which lasts approximately 400 ms and it is
called whine. We refer to this call as simple call. Males add higher frequency sounds called
chucks to the whine call in order to create more complex calls. Each chuck lasts around
42 ms and one male can add from one to seven chucks to the whine to form what we refer
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as a complex call. All males are equally capable of producing the same calls, so bias in
the proportion of a certain call is due to males decision ([10]). Most males form choruses
along the shore of the ponds. The choruses comprise call bouts and pauses in between.
Based on the studies of X.E. Bernal et al. [7], in those choruses, tu´ngara frogs produce
over 167 calls in three minutes, from which 70 percent are simple calls and the remaining
are complex calls. The bouts are started by focal males. A focal male produces over 26
calls per call bout, which last over 66 seconds. From those calls, 53 percent are simple. In
[2] it is shown that when females are close to the choruses, the proportion of simple calls
decreases to over 30 percent of the bout. In this paper, we are interested in the proportion
of calls prior to the moment when the females get close.
According to the studies of M. Ryan in Barro Colorado, Panama ([10]), the reproductive
ritual takes place from 19:00 to 24:00. The ritual comprises the call bouts, the assessment
and choice of the female, the mating (amplexus) and the nesting. The males wait from the
shore, separated at least by 5 cm from one another, for the females in the pond. Males
produce a sound called meu (see [10]) to prevent other males from getting closer. If a male
gets close enough to another male, he is pushed away. Once a female has come close enough
to several choruses and makes a choice, the chosen male gets on the female back putting
together their cloacae. The female transfer her eggs into the male cloaca for the male to
fertilize them. In this process, the female transports the male on her back away from the
shoreline of the pond. After midnight, the couple comes back to the the shoreline of the
pond to build a foam nest that contains over 230 fertilized eggs [10]. This implies that once
a male is chosen, it does not mate again. Tu´ngara males do not fight between one another
to mate, instead females walk towards them. In [9] it was observed that non-calling males
sometimes intercept females that are going towards calling males. In consequence, this can
be also considered a strategy in mating. In [9] it is also mentioned that it has not been
observed unmated males displace a male in amplexus.
In [10], Ryan argues that males do not come back to the same place in the pond every
night. Furthermore, males do not defend any resource. This implies that the choice of the
female is not oriented to obtain better resources. This is also evident due to the fact that
females mostly build the nest in a place different from where they choose the males.
Females prefer complex calls than simple ones. The data in [12] accounts for this
preference. In that study it is established that the probability of a female to choose a
complex caller over a simple caller is around p := 0.8. Moreover, in [12] it is observed that
the mean time for a female to cast a choice between a complex and a simple caller is not
different from the mean time to cast a choice between two complex callers. In [10] it is
also shown that the accuracy with which females detect either a complex or a simple call is
the same. Therefore, females actually make a decision between simple and complex callers
entirely based on the type of call. M. Ryan also showed that the bigger the chorus, the
more females are attracted.
Tu´ngara frogs have several predators. Among them, we find opossums Philandeu opos-
sum that detect the frogs because of the sound, the South American bullfrog Leptodactylus
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pentadactylus that detects the frogs visually and the crab Potamocarcinus richmondi that
detects the frogs visually too. Regardless or these species, the main predator of Tu´ngara
frog is the Fringe-lipped bat Trachops cirrhosus that detects the frog through echolocation.
These bats identify the high frequency sounds more easily. M. Ryan and M. Tuttle proved
that between a simple and a complex caller, bats choose the complex with probability
pi := 23 (see [11]). Frogs detect bats visually, and the effect of the presence of a bat in the
choruses is that all frogs become quiet and the pause between bouts become longer ([10]).
Regarding the response time of the bats, in [6] it is shown that the response of the bats to
simple calls is longer than the response to complex calls.
Based on his studies, M. Ryan claims that the variety of calls in these amphibians has
evolved because: “it allows a male to adjust call complexity to effect a compromise between
maximizing mate attraction ability and minimizing predation risk” ([10]). In consequence,
we study the proportion of simple calls to complex calls in a bout, to explain the idea of
maximizing reproductive success and minimizing predation risk. In this paper we propose
that the dynamic of a replicator equation capture this phenomenon.
In Section 2, we present models with two and three strategies. The first one accounts
for the simple call and complex call regarded as strategies of a symmetric game. In the
second model we added the quiet state as an strategy. In Section 3, we present the results of
the stability analysis of the equilibrium points of our models. We also extrapolate intervals
for the parameters that cannot be found in the literature so that the model reproduces
the reported observations. The justification of the results presented are exposed in an
Appendix in the section 5.
2 The models
2.1 Model with two strategies
The payoff for the two strategies, complex call and simple call, will be measured in terms
of their reproductive success. We will denote by C and S respectively the strategies of
complex call and simple call. Our symmetric game is set as follows: we have two males in
a pond using strategiesX,Y , whereX,Y ∈ {C, S}, a female assessing them, and potentially
nearby there is a bat considering to attack.
In order to capture the previous ideas, we define the parameters shown in Table 1 where
by an encounter XY we mean the two frogs are using strategies X and Y .
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Parameter Description
p Probability that a female chooses a complex caller in an encounter CS
pi Probability that a bat chooses a complex caller in an encounter CS
rXY Average number of choices that a female makes per unit of time in an encounter XY
ρXY Average number of choices that a bat makes in an encounter XY
dS Ratio of rSS to rCS (rSS = dSrCS)
dC Ratio of rCC to rCS (rCC = dCrCS)
δS Ratio of ρSS to ρCS (ρSS = δSρCS)
δC Ratio of ρCC to ρCS (ρCC = δCρCS)
Table 1: Parameters of the model with two strategies
We denote by P (X,Y ) the payoff of a male using the strategy X in an encounter XY .
Therefore we have
P (S, S) =
0.5rSS
0.5ρSS
P (S,C) =
(1− p)rCS
(1− pi)ρCS
P (C, S) =
prCS
piρCS
P (C,C) =
0.5rCC
0.5ρCC
For example, to obtain the payoff P (C, S) we proceed as follows. In an encounter CS, the
average number of decisions cast by a female per unit of time is rCS and p of them will
be in favor of the complex caller. Similarly, in an encounter CS, the average number of
decisions cast by a bat per unit of time is ρCS and pi of them will be for the complex caller;
thus, the expected time a frog can play the C strategy in CS encounters is (piρCS)
−1. The
payoff is similarly defined for the rest of the encounters. The probability that a female frog
or a bat chooses one or the other is 1/2 if both male frogs are using the same strategy.
Using the definition of dS , dC , ρs, ρc given in Table 1, we get the payoff matrix in (1).
A2 =
(
P (S, S) P (S,C)
P (C, S) P (C,C)
)
=
rCS
ρCS
(
dS
δS
(1−p)
(1−pi)
p
pi
dC
δC
)
(1)
2.2 Model with three strategies
As we mentioned in the introduction, quiet males mate by intercepting females that were
walking towards calling males. The quiet strategy leads males to be safe from predation.
However, this strategy reduces the chances of males of being chosen by females. In an
encounter between a quiet and a calling male, let θ be the probability that the quiet frog
intercepts a female that goes towards the calling male. Let Q, S and C denote respectively
the strategies of staying quiet, producing simple calls and producing complex calls. In
Table 2, we define the parameters of the model.
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Parameter Description
θ Probability that a quiet male intercepts a female going toward a calling male
p Probability that a female chooses a complex caller in an encounter CS
pi Probability that a bat chooses a complex caller in an encounter CS
rXY Average number of choices that a female makes per unit of time in an encounter XY
ρXY Average number of choices that a bat makes per unit of time in an encounter XY
dXY Ratio of rXY to rCS (rXY = dXY rCS), for XY ∈ {SQ,CQ}
dX Ratio of rXX to rCS (rXX = dXrCS), for X ∈ {S,C}
δXY Ratio of ρXY to ρCS (ρXY = δXY ρCS), for XY ∈ {SQ,CQ}
δX Ratio of ρXX to ρCS (ρXX = δXρCS), for X ∈ {S,C}
R Ratio of rXQ to rXS : reduction in number of choices a female makes per unit of time
when a quiet male takes the place of a simple caller (rSQ = RrSS and rCQ = RrCS)
Table 2: Parameters of the model with three strategies
The payoffs P (X,Y ) for the strategy X in each encounter XY are the following:
P (Q,Q) = 0 P (Q,S) = θ
rSQ
ρSQ
P (Q,C) = θ
rCQ
ρCQ
P (S,Q) = (1− θ) rSQ
ρSQ
P (S, S) =
0.5rSS
0.5ρSS
P (S,C) =
(1− p)rCS
(1− pi)ρCS
P (C,Q) = (1− θ) rCQ
ρCQ
P (C, S) =
prCS
piρCS
P (C,C) =
0.5rCC
0.5ρCC
Payoffs are obtained as in the two strategies scenarios. For encounters involving a quiet
frog we reason as follows. Whenever there is a XQ encounter, for X ∈ {S,C}, the female
and the bat will choose the calling frog with probability 1; therefore, the expected number
of times the calling frog will be chosen by a female is rXQ/ρXQ. Now, in those encounters
the quiet frog will only get a payoff when he manages to intercept the female frog. This
happens with a ratio θ.
In [10], M. Ryan showed that females are more lured to bigger choruses. Therefore, we
assume that, for X ∈ {S,C}, the rate at which a female chooses in a XQ encounter is less
than in a XS encounter. Let R be this reduction rate, so that rSQ = RrSS and rCQ = rCS .
From [10], we estimate that R = 0.8.
Note that dSQ = rSQ/rSC = (
rSQ
rSS
)( rSSrSC ) = RdS and dCQ =
rCQ
rCS
= R.
In [5], W. Halfwerk et al. showed that bats mainly locate their preys due to high
frequency sounds. Therefore, we assume that, for X ∈ {S,C}, the rate at which a bat cast
his choice in a XQ encounter is the same as in a XS encounter. Hence, ρSQ = ρSS and
ρCQ = ρCS .
Note that δSQ = ρSQ/ρCS = (
ρSQ
ρSS
)( ρSSρCS ) = δS and δCQ =
ρCQ
ρCS
= 1.
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In Table 3, we summarize these assumptions.
Assumption Reference
P (Q,Q) = 0 [10]
rSQ = RrSS and rCQ = rCS [10]
ρSQ = ρSS and ρCQ = ρCS [5]
Table 3: Assumptions on the quiet strategy
Using the parameters in Table 2 and the assumptions in Table 3, we get the payoff
matrix in 2.
A3 =
P (Q,Q) P (Q,S) P (Q,C)P (S,Q) P (S, S) P (S,C)
P (C,Q) P (C, S) P (C,C)
 = rCS
ρCS
 0 θR
dS
δS
θR
(1− θ)RdSδS
dS
δS
(1−p)
(1−pi)
(1− θ)R ppi dCδC
 . (2)
3 Results
3.1 Model with two strategies
Let us remark that in a symmetric game with two strategies the stable points of the
replicator equation are exactly the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) (see [13, Proposition
3.15]). Therefore, the optimal strategies correspond to the stable points of the replicator
equation defined by the matrix in (1). By optimal we mean that these strategies can not
be invaded by others.
The replicator equation for the proportion of simple calls s in our model with two
strategies is (see Subsection 5.1 in Appendix):
s˙ = s(1− s)(a− (a+ b)s) (3)
where
a := (
1− p
1− pi −
dC
δC
)
rCS
ρCS
and b := (
p
pi
− dS
δS
)
rCS
ρCS
.
The equilibrium points are s0 = 0, s1 = 1, sˆ =
a
a+b .
From [12], the rate for which a female makes a choice in a CS encounter and in a CC
encounter is the same. Therefore, we take dC = 1.
Because of the preference of the bats for complex callers, we take δC > 1 > δS . Similarly,
because of the preference of the females for complex callers, we will assume that rSC ≥ rSS .
In consequence, we take dS < 1.
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Using the criteria shown in Table 4 in Subsection 5.2 of Appendix, in the ppi-plane, the
lines a = 0 or b = 0 subdivide the unit square in regions of stability for each of the three
equilibria (Figure 1). The explicit equation for the lines a = 0 and b = 0 are respectively
(6) and (7) in Subsection 5.2 of Appendix.
Figure 1: Stability regions for the equilibria sˆ = 0, sˆ = 1, sˆ = aa+b in the ppi-plane. The
pure strategies s0 = 0 and s1 = 1 are respectively stable above the b = 0 line and below the
a = 0 line; in-between there is coexistence. It is reported in [11] and in [12] that pi > p (the
region below the dashed red line). It is also reported in [7] that there exists coexistence
and sˆ > 1/2. Therefore, the parameters p and pi should be between the curve sˆ = 1/2 and
the red line a = 0
From the literature, we know that the preference of females for complex callers over
simple callers is greater than the preference of bats for complex callers over simple callers.
Therefore p > pi. Moreover, both strategies coexist in a proportion 0 < sˆ < 1 of simple
calls. In consequence, the values p and pi are in the region between a = 0 and b = 0.
We also have that the lines a = 0 and b = 0 do not intersect in the unit square and
a = 0 is below b = 0. Otherwise, we would have an scenario that makes no biological sense,
as it is explained in Subsection 5.2 of Appendix. Similarly, from a biological perspective,
both slopes must be greater than 1, which means that in the parameter of the model we
have δS ≥ dS and δC ≥ dC .
We define eSC = (1 − p)/(1 − pi) and eSC = p/pi, and we assume that p = 4/5 and
pi = 2/3. Figure 2 also shows the line sˆ = 1/2 (see the equation (8) in Subsection 5.2 of
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Appendix). Below this line we have the values of eSS and eCC for which sˆ > 1/2, as it is
reported in literature (see [7]).
Figure 2: Using the values of p and pi found in the literature we get the values of sˆ shown
in this figure. Is is reported in literature the the value of sˆ is greater than 1/2, which is
the case for the values of eSS and eCC below the black line in this figure
3.2 Model with three strategies
If θ = 0 males do not intercept females, and we recover the same dynamics as in the model
with two strategies. Using the matrix A3 introduced in 2, we have that the replicator
equation is given by the following system of equations:{
q˙ = q((A3x¯)1 − x¯tA3x¯)
s˙ = s((A3x¯)2 − x¯tA3x¯)
(4)
where q and s are respectively the proportion of quiet males and complex callers, x¯ is
the vector [q, s, 1− q − s] and (A3x¯)i is the entry i of the vector A3x¯ for i = 1, 2.
In Subsection 5.3 of Appendix we show that there are at most three equilibria besides
the pure strategies (q, s) = (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0). Two of them are wQC , with s = 0, and
wSC , with q = 0. A third possible equilibrium is w
∗ = (q∗, s∗) where the three strategies
coexist, q∗, s∗ > 0 and q∗ + s∗ < 1.
We define eXY = P (X,Y )(
ρXY
rXY
) for any encounter XY (see the matrices in 2). For
example, eSC = (1− p)/(1− pi) and eSC = p/pi.
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From the eigenvalues and eigenvectors analysis in Subsection 5.4 of Appendix, we obtain
that the equilibrium wSC exists if eCC < eSC = 0.6. We assume that eCC always satisfies
this inequality, as in the coexistence scenario of the model with two strategies. If 0 < θ <
eCC/R, we have that wQS and w
∗ do not exist. In this case, wSC is stable. In the subspace
where q+ s = 1 we always have that the equilibrium (0, 1) is stable. In the subspace where
q = 0 we always have that wSC is stable. In the subspace where s = 0, for 0 < θ < eCC/R
we have that (0, 0) is stable. If eCC/R < θ < eSC/R, we have that w
∗ does not exist
and wQS exists. In this case, wSC is also stable, and the equilibrium wQS is stable in the
subspace where s = 0. Figure 3 shows the previous two scenarios.
(a) 0 < θ < eCCR (b)
eCC
R < θ <
eSC
R
Figure 3: The red dashed line represents the nullcline s˙ = 0 and the blue dashed line
represents the nullcline q˙ = 0. The black arrows represent the directions of the trajectories
of the model. In each figure we assume that wSC exists, which is equivalent to eCC < eSC .
Figure (a) shows that if 0 < θ < eCCR , we obtain the behavior represented by the two
strategies model. Figure (b) shows that if eCCR < θ <
eSC
R , the equilibrium wQC appears.
In the scenarios (a) and (b), wSC is the only stable equilibria.
If 3/4 = eSC/R < θ < 1, we have that the coexistence equilibrium w
∗ could exist
(see the equation (12) in Subsection 5.3 of Appendix). We analyzed the existence of this
equilibrium in terms of the parameters eSS , eCC and θ. Figure 4 shows the regions in the
plane eSSeCC where there could be coexistence in terms of the functions eCC = f1(θ, eSS)
and eCC = f2(θ, eSS) for fixed values of θ (see the equation (16) and the equation (17)
in Subsection 5.4 of Appendix for the definition of f1 and f2). For θ > eSC/R we have
that w∗ exists and is stable if f1 ≤ eCC ≤ f2. However, w∗ does not exists if eCC < f1 or
eCC > f2. In these cases, wSC or wQC are respectively stable (see Figure 4). We have that
the region of the plane eSSeCC for which sˆ > 1/2 in the two strategies game (below the
line of the Figure 2 in Subsection 3.1) is contained in the region below f2 in Figure 4 (see
Subsection 5.4 of Appendix). Therefore, wQC would not be stable if we are based on the
parameters of the model with two strategies.
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(a) eCC < f1 (b) f1 ≤ eCC ≤ f2 (c) eCC > f2
Figure 4: The red dashed line represents the nullcline s˙ = 0 and the blue dashed line
represents the nullcline q˙ = 0. The black arrows represent the directions of the trajectories
of the model. In each figure we assume that wSC exists, which is equivalent to eCC < eSC =
0.6. We also assume that eSCR < θ < 1. Figure (a) shows that in the region eCC < f1 in the
plane eSSeCC (at the bottom), the equilibrium wSC is stable. Figure (b) shows that in the
region f1 < eCC < f2 in the plane eSSeCC (at the bottom), the coexistence equilibrium w
∗
appears and is stable. Similarly, Figure (c) shows that in the region eCC > f2 in the plane
eSSeCC (at the bottom), the equilibrium wQC is stable. Furthermore, if we use the values
of eSS and eCC for which sˆ > 1/2 in the model of two strategies (see Figure 2), we have
that wQC is never stable.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Even though in [8] A. Lea and M. Ryan show that the decision of the female could be
irrational, in this work we show that there is an scenario in which the behavior of the male
Tu´ngara frog is rational. Regarding the model with two strategies, in Subsection 3.1 we
concluded that δCdC ≥ 1 and
δS
dS
≥ 1 in order that the ESS made sense when varying p and
pi. Although we can suggest from [12] that dC on average is around 1, we did not obtain
from the literature the values of δC , δS and dS . Nonetheless, in [6] there is data on the
latency of the bat response to the complex call compared to the response to the simple call.
In that study, it is shown that the response of the bat to the complex call is faster than the
response of the bat to the simple call, which leads us to suggest that the rate of predation
is larger as there are more complex callers (in particular, ρCS > ρCC). As δC =
ρCS
ρCC
, we
10
get that δCdC ≥ 1 is coherent. The latency times reported in [6] are obtained setting a bat
next to records of calls. However, our δS and δC measure the response of a bat that it is
not close to an encounter (if a bat is close to the encounter, the males get quiet according
to [10]). For this reason, although this data is evidence of difference in latency of the bat
response, the values reported in [6] are not considered as parameters of our models.
On the other hand, the preference of the female for the complex calls is over 0.8 ([10]
and [12]). This leads us to suggest that when there are no complex callers the response of
the females decreases (in particular dS < 1). However, we did not find a study where the
latency of the response of the female to only simple calls is measured. From the observations
in [6], we also have that δS < 1. Besides, the preference of the bats for the complex call is
not as high as the preference of the female. Moreover, the sensitivity of the echolocation
of the bats for the ripples made by the calls in the water ([1]) make these predator to be
capable of responding to simple calls also. Therefore, it makes sense to assume that the
reduction of the mating choice of the female is higher than the reduction of the predation
rate of the bats when there are only simple call (which means δSdS ≥ 1).
The proportion of calls in a bout reported in [7] is over 0.6 in a chorus in absence of
bats and females. This natural behavior can be replicated by our two strategies model as
it is shown in the Figure 2 in Subsection 3.1 (below the line). From Figure 2 we must
have that eSS =
dS
δS
must be close to 1 and eCC =
dC
δC
must be small. The fact that δC is
large is suggesting that the predation rate is sensible to the complex callers that are added.
This agrees with the fact that high frequency calls produce more conspicuous ripples in
the water, which are easier to detect as it is shown in [1].
In consequence, the model is showing that there is a coherent scenario where the preda-
tion and reproductive conditions make possible to look at the proportion of calls reported
in [7] as an evolutionary stable strategy.
In [9], it is observed that quiet males intercepts females that were walking towards a
calling male. Hence, we could think this as an strategy to avoid predation and having
reproductive success. Nonetheless, in [10] and [7] it is observed that most of the males
call in a bout. The aim of our second model was to look at the effect of adding the quiet
strategy to the first model. We obtained that the proportion θ of times that a quiet frog
must intercept females to mate must be large in order to have that the quiet strategy is a
rational option (in the sense that there is a stable point of the replicator equation in which
the three strategies coexist). We obtained that the coexistence of the three strategies
holds as long as θ > 3/4. This means that a quiet frog should intercept females most
of the times to get a reproductive success which justifies to keep quiet. Such a frequent
behavior is not reported in the literature. In [9] it is only mentioned that the quiet males
sometimes intercept females that walk toward calling males, and in [7] it is observed that
in a bout the quiet strategy does not coexists with the other strategies. Therefore, our
second model explains that the strategy observed in [9] is not rational in a chorus in terms
of reproductive success, which agrees with the observed behavior in nature.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Model with two strategies: Equilibria of the model
In Section 2.1 we defined the following payoff matrix for the game with two strategies:
A2 =
rCS
ρCS
(
dS
δS
(1−p)
(1−pi)
p
pi
dC
δC
)
=
rCS
ρCS
(
eSS eSC
eCS eCC
)
.
From this matrix, we obtain the replicator equation:
s˙ = s((A2x¯)1 − x¯tA2x¯).
This equation is equivalent to the equation:
s˙ = s(1− s)(a− (a+ b)s).
where
a := (
1− p
1− pi −
dC
δC
)
rCS
ρCS
and b := (
p
pi
− dS
δS
)
rCS
ρCS
.
We obtain three possible equilibria of this equation: the pure strategies s0 = 0, s1 = 1
and the coexistence equilibrium
sˆ =
a
a+ b
=
eSC − eCC
eSC − eCC + eCS − eSS (5)
if 0 < aa+b < 1.
5.2 Model with two strategies: Stability of the equilibria
Table 4 shows the criteria for the stability of the equilibria presented in the previous
subsection.
Equilibrium Stability criteria
s0 = 0 a < 0
s1 = 1 b < 0
sˆ = aa+b
−ab
a+b < 0
Table 4: Criteria for the stability of the equation (3).
We have that aa+b = 0 if 0 =
1−p
1−pi − dCδC or equivalently
pi =
δC
dC
p+ (1− δC
dC
). (6)
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The equation (6) determines a straight line in the plane ppi. Just below this line, we
have that the simple strategy dominates. On the other hand, aa+b = 1 if 0 =
p
pi − dSδS or
equivalently
pi =
δS
dS
p. (7)
Just above the line defined by the equation (7), the complex strategy dominates. Fur-
thermore, both strategies coexist between the lines defined by the equations (6) and (7),
as Figure 1 shows.
In Subsection 3.1, we had mentioned that the lines defined by the equations (6) and
(7) must not cross each other for p = p∗ < 1. Otherwise, in the region between the lines
for p∗ ≤ p ≤ 1 we get that for fixed p, if pi increases, then sˆ decreases. This would mean
that if we fix the preference of the females, and we increase the preference of the bats for
the complex calls, then an optimal strategy is to produce more complex calls, which does
not make sense.
Therefore, the slope of the line a = 0 can not be smaller than 1, which means that we
must have δCdC ≥ 1 (see the equation (6)). Likewise, the slope of the line b = 0 con not be
below 1, which is equivalent to δSdS ≥ 1 (see the equation (7)).
From [7] we have sˆ ≥ 0.5. Therefore, using the equation (5) we have that sˆ ≥ 0.5 if
eCC ≤ eSS − (eCS − eSC) = eSS − 3/5. (8)
This is the equation of the line in Figure 2.
5.3 Model with three strategies: Equilibria of the model
In Subsection 2.2 we defined the following payoff matrix for the game with three strategies:
A3 =
rCS
ρCS
 0 θR
dS
δS
θR
(1− θ)RdSδS
dS
δS
(1−p)
(1−pi)
(1− θ)R ppi dCδC
 = rCS
ρCS
 0 eQS eQCeSQ eSS eSC
eCQ eCS eCC
 .
We also defined the replicator equation given by:{
q˙ = q((A3x¯)1 − x¯tA3x¯)
s˙ = s((A3x¯)2 − x¯tA3x¯)
We have that there are three equilibria in the corners of the triangle {(q, s) : q + s ≤
1, q ≥ 0, s ≥ 0}, which are (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0). The replicator equation has also the
following equilibria:
wQC := (
eQC − eCC
eCQ + eQC − eCC , 0) (9)
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wSC := (0,
eSC − eCC
eSC − eCC + eCS − eSS ) (10)
wQS = (
eQS − eSS
eQS − eSS + eSQ ,
eQS
eQS − eSS + eSQ ) (11)
We have that the equilibrium wQC is within the side of the triangle if eQC = Rθ >
eCC . The equilibrium wSC is within the side of the triangle if eSC > eCC . However, the
equilibrium wQS never exists within the side of the triangle because eQS − eSS < 0 and
eSQ > 0.
In addition, there could be a coexistence equilibrium of the three strategies w∗, which
is defined as follows:
w∗ = (
ν
ν + ξ + 
,
ξ
ν + ξ + 
) (12)
where
ν = eCCeSS + eQSeSC + eQCeCS − eQSeCC − eQCeSS − eSCeCS (13)
ξ = eSQeQC + eCQeSC − eCQeQC − eSQeCC (14)
 = eCQeQC + eSQeCC − eSQeQC − eQCeSC (15)
5.4 Model with three strategies: Stability of the equilibria
Figure 5 represents the eigenvectors for each equilibrium point and Table 5 shows their
eigenvalues (except for w∗).
Figure 5: Eigenvectors of equilibria.
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Point Eigenvector Eigenvalue Sign
q = 0, s = 1 s¯1 = (0,−1) eCS − eSS +
s¯2 = (1,−1) eQS − eSS = θReSS − eSS -
q = 1, s = 0 q¯1 = (1,−1) eSQ +
q¯2 = (−1, 0) eCQ +
q = 0, s = 0 c¯1 = (1, 0) eQC − eCC + or -
c¯2 = (0, 1) eSC − eCC + or -
wQC u¯1 eCQ(eCC − eQC)/(eCQ + eQC − eCC) -
u¯2 ξ/(eCQ + eQC − eCC) + if ξ > 0 or - if ξ < 0
wSC v¯1 (eCC − eSC)(eCS − eSS)/(eSC − eCC + eCS − eSS) -
v¯2 ν/(eSC − eCC + eCS − eSS) + if ν > 0 or - if ν < 0
Table 5: This table lists the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the replicator equation for
the model with three strategies computed in each equilibrium (except the coexistence
equilibrium). The last column shows the possible sign that each eigenvalue could have.
We have that  is always positive. We also have that ν > 0 is equivalent to:
eCC > f1(θ, eSS) :=
eQSeSC + eQCeCS − eQCeSS − eSCeCS
eSS − eQS (16)
Similarly, ξ > 0 is equivalent to:
eCC < f2(θ, eSS) :=
eSQeQC + eCQeSC − eCQeQC
eSQ
(17)
Figure 6 shows the possible scenarios for f1 and f2 depending on the value of θ. If
θ < eSC/R, we have that f1 > f2 (left side in Figure 6). Besides, f1 and f2 are decreasing
and convex. We also have that f1 and f2 are above f(θ, 1) = eSC . In consequence, if
eCC < eSC (which is equivalent to the existence of wSC), we have that ν < 0 and ξ > 0.
This implies that if θ < eSC/R, then wSC is stable, wQS is unstable (if exists) and w
∗ does
not exist.
On the other hand, f1 < f2 if θ > eSC/R (right side in Figure 6). Moreover, f1 and f2
are increasing and concave functions that are below f(θ, 1) = eSC . If we assume that wSC
always exists (which is equivalent to eCC < eSC), then we have eQC = Rθ > eCC . This
last inequality is equivalent to the existence of wQC . Furthermore, if eCC < f1 (ν < 0 and
ξ > 0), the equilibrium wSC is stable and if eCC > f2 (ν > 0 and ξ < 0), the equilibrium
wQC is stable. We also have that w
∗ exists if f1 < eCC < f2 (which is equivalent to ν > 0
and ξ > 0).
In the model with two strategies we have that sˆ > 1/2 if eCC ≤ eSS − (eCS − eSC).
We also have that the segment l(eSS) := eSS − (eCS − eSC), eCC ≥ 0, eSS ≤ 1 is below the
concave function f2 for θ > eSC/R. Indeed, l(1) = 1 − (eCS − eSC) ≤ eSC = f2(θ, 1) and
f2(eCS − eSC) ≥ 0. In consequence, if sˆ > 1/2 for the model with two strategies, we have
eCC < f2 and wQC is unstable.
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(a) θ < eSC/R = 3/4 (b) θ > eSC/R = 3/4
Figure 6: Possible scenarios for f1 and f2 depending on the value of θ.
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